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Abstract 
This study examines responses of 104 sell-side and buy-side security analysts to a survey sent out in order to 
understand how analysts conduct investment recommendations. Uncertainty about the quality of analysts’ 
investment recommendations is a major concern for retail investors. Specifically, the information gathering, 
processing and transferring process appears to be a black box for retail investors. The findings of our study 
provide insight into analyst-specific characteristics and sources of information used by analysts to undertake 
firm-specific research. By examining the practitioners’ responses we derive key factors which influence 
investment recommendations. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Analysts’ activities appear to be a black box for retail investors (hereafter: investors). In 
particular, uncertainty about the quality of analysts’ investment recommendations is a major 
concern for investors (Morgen and Stocken 2003, Barber et al. 2006, Ramnath et al. 2008). 
Generally, this quality uncertainty is determined by three core aspects. First, analyst-specific 
characteristics including experience, professional background, competences and motives 
affect investment recommendations. Second, the research process (information gathering, 
processing and transfer) is widely intransparent for investors. Third, conflicts of interest 
emerging in the context of analysts’ activities have reduced the credibility of their 
recommendations (Fisch and Sale 2003, Choi 2007). It is unclear whether changes of the 
regulatory environment have mitigated conflicts of interest.   
Prior research has primarily focused on understanding the stock valuation process including 
the applied methodological approaches at a broader level (Chugh and Meador 1984, 
Bouwman et al. 1987, Block 1999; Gleason et al. 2013). However, from the investors’ 
perspective relevant information in the context of generating investment recommendations are 
still largely unknown. This is why we conducted a survey among sell-side and buy-side 
security analysts (hereafter: analysts) to explicitly address the three core aspects. In this paper 
we examine responses of 104 security analysts who completed our survey between January 
and September 2013. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. We directly survey analysts 
and obtain a unique data set. By examining the practitioners’ responses we derive key factors 
which influence investment recommendations. Our results make analysts’ activities more 
transparent for investors.     
Based on our data set we attain an understanding of sources of information used by analysts to 
undertake firm-specific research, of analysts’ self-perceived forecast accuracy, of the 
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influence of IT-based evaluation models as part of the forecast process and an understanding 
of the performance evaluation undertaken by analysts’ employers. We find that analysts 
(strongly) rely on IT-based evaluation models when deriving investment recommendations. 
The average analyst in our sample graduated from university, has 10 years of professional 
experience and covers 12 firms on a regular basis. In addition, our results show that more than 
50 percent of the analysts specify that their employers’ objective to generate brokerage 
commission (by regularly producing research reports) is very/rather influential with respect to 
the determination of investment recommendations. This is why we thoroughly examine the 
recent regulatory efforts which attempt to mitigate conflicts of interest. Since our results have 
high practical relevance for the scientific and practitioner-oriented literature, we consider this 
paper to be of interest for academics, practitioners and regulators. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related 
literature. Section 3 explains the design of the questionnaire and formulates hypothesis. 
Section 4 presents characteristics of our unique dataset and discusses the findings, while 
Section 5 gives a conclusion of this paper. 
 
2 Related Literature 
2.1 The Role of Analyst-specific Characteristics 
Investors can benefit by being aware of personal characteristics that help to identify accurate 
analysts. Prior research has identified numerous relevant characteristics. Specifically, Mikhail 
et al. (1997), Clement (1999), Jacob et al. (1999), Brown (2001); Clement et al. (2003), 
Clement and Tse (2003) and Höfer and Oehler (2013) examine empirically that prior forecast 
accuracy, frequency of forecasting, experience, forecast horizon, and number of firms covered 
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are relevant variables that affect the accuracy of either earnings or target price forecasts made 
by analysts.  
It is also well established that the analysts’ timing ability is a crucial factor. Empirical 
evidence of O’Brien (1988) suggests that “recent” forecasts have lower forecast errors than 
forecasts issued “earlier” (i.e. prior to a firm announces quarterly or annual earnings). By 
deferring the publication of the recommendation, analysts can gather and incorporate further 
information that is part of other analysts’ forecasts and firm-specific disclosure issued earlier 
(Kim et al. 2011). In addition, Loh and Mian (2006) discuss the relevance of analysts’ 
characteristics and find a positive relationship between the analyst-specific accuracy and the 
profitability of their contemporaneous stock recommendations. Given this finding, Loh and 
Stulz (2009) argue that accurate analysts have a larger impact on markets because their 
recommendations are accompanied by earnings forecasts with low expected forecast errors. 
 
2.2 Analysts’ Stock Valuation Models 
The stock valuation techniques used by analysts are generally categorized into two broad 
methodologies, namely discounted cash flow (DCF) models and relative valuation multiples 
(e.g. price-to-earnings ratio, book-to-market ratio, price-to-revenue ratio) (Bouwman et al. 
1987, Gleason et al., 2013). Since analysts must state the applied methodologies used to 
derive recommendations in the research report, it is well documented that most analysts 
neglect DCF models and emphasize on earnings multiples. For instance, Asquith et al. (2005) 
find that in 99 percent of the examined research reports earnings multiples are mentioned. In 
only 13 percent of the reports DCF models are stated. In line with these findings, Demirakos 
et al. (2004) highlight that almost all reports in their sample mention valuation multiples; 
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about 50 percent state DCF models.1 However, Bradshaw (2002, 2004) finds that advanced 
DCF models used by analysts during the research process yield more profitable 
recommendations for investors than, for instance, multiples. Using survey methodology, 
Block (1999) examines the techniques used by analysts who are members of the Association 
for Investment Management and Research (AIMR)2. He finds that analysts do not pay much 
attention to the dividend policy of a company and that only half of the 297 respondents use 
present value analysis and future P/E ratios.  
By and large, analysts tend to neglect the CAPM as well as the short-term quarterly earnings 
and put more weight on the EVA approach and the long-term prospects of a company. Chugh 
and Meador (1984) survey analysts and Block (1999) confirms their results in most aspects: 
First, the expected changes in dividends as well as the dividend yield are considered by 
analysts to be the most unimportant factors in deriving forecasts. Second, analysts emphasize 
on long-run instead of short-run observations including expected EPS changes, expected 
return on equity and industry-specific outlooks. In addition, firm-specific factors such as the 
quality and credibility of the management and the market position are crucial economic 
variables for analysts. 
 
2.3 Conflicts of Interest 
Another emphasis in the literature argues that analysts might have an eye on certain valuation 
techniques; however, the business interests of their employers influence the outcome of 
analysts’ research. In general, analysts work for banks and investment companies which 
conduct investment banking and advisory services. Conflicts of interest arise when the 
investment bank wants to attract or retain companies as clients in order to offer consultancy 
                                                          
1 For a detailed discussion on the models used by analysts see Gleason et al. (2013). 
2 AIMR is now known as the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute. 
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services, e.g. in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) or initial public offerings 
(IPO) (Lin and McNichols 1998, Michaely and Womack 1999, Dechow et al. 2000, Bradshaw 
et al. 2003). The investment bank has an interest in positive analyst coverage of the respective 
firms in order to stimulate business success. Hence, analysts face a trade-off between 1) 
compliance with the business interests of the investment bank and 2) forecast accuracy 
(Mikhail et al. 1997, Moloney 2008, Höfer and Oehler 2013). Further conflicts of interest 
arise when analysts are obliged to make positively biased investment recommendations in 
order to stimulate profits from brokerage commissions.  
As a response to several analyst scandals, that uncovered misbehavior and malpractice, 
regulators around the world have introduced regulatory measures in order to mitigate conflicts 
of interest (Contoudis 2003, Fisch and Sale 2003, De Franco et al. 2007). Specifically, 
regulators have established measures to primarily mitigate conflicts of interests, to strengthen 
Chinese Walls (Kolasinski 2006) and to implement independent remuneration for analysts 
(Moloney 2008). For instance, in the US3 and in the EU4 banks must implement 1) effective 
processes that prevent and control information flows between analysts, other bank-internal 
divisions and employees of the evaluated firms, 2) measures that prevent and supervise 
analysts’ actions and 3) measures that inhibit the inappropriate influence of a third party on 
analyst research reports (Fisch and Sale 2003, Choi 2007, Moloney 2008, Höfer and Oehler 
2013). 
 
 
                                                          
3 In the United States regulators introduced regulations (Rule NASD 2711, Rule NYSE 472, and the “Global 
Analyst Research Settlement”) to mitigate the potential interdependence between the research and the investment 
bank divisions (Fisch and Sale 2003, Choi 2007). 
4 In the European Union regulators introduced the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID). Generally, these directives were introduced to 1) establish a single market in 
financial services and 2) assure market integrity as well as investor protection (Frésard et al. 2011, Moloney 
2008). 
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3 Design of the Questionnaire, Hypotheses Development and Methodology 
In the survey we utilized a standardized questionnaire with both closed-ended and open-ended 
questions. The questionnaire is designed while considering the findings in the literature, such 
as introducing consistency and unambiguous questions (Sudman et al. 1996, Schwarz and 
Oyserman, 2001). In contrast to previous surveys (Baldwin and Rice 1996, Hunton and 
McEwen 1997, Boni and Womack 2002), we asked these analysts to provide detailed 
information on three core aspects namely 1) analyst-specific characteristics (e.g. age, 
educational background, competences, work experience, self-perceived accuracy), 2) the 
research process (e.g. information gathering, processing and transfer, the influence of 
computer-based evaluation models), and 3) conflicts of interest (e.g. success of regulatory 
guidelines, impact of employers’ activities). 
The questionnaire’s response options range from 0 (No) to 1 (Yes) (e.g. “Do regulatory 
guidelines […] have an impact upon your activities as an analyst?”) and from 1 to 5 (e.g. “Do 
you consider yourself as an ‘accurate’ analyst (i.e. your target price forecasts exhibit low 
forecast errors)?: 1=very accurate, 2=rather accurate, 3=neutral, 4=rather less accurate, 5=less 
accurate)5. 
Personal background specifications influence the job performance of individuals (Wise 1975a, 
Wise 1975b). In particular, professional experience has been identified as a key element of 
analysts’ self-development (Mikhail et al. 1997). When analysts accumulate experience they 
are expected to gain additional know-how on, e.g., the functioning of financial markets, 
corporate finance and IT-based evaluation models (Höfer and Oehler 2013). Hence, as 
analysts repeat certain tasks – particularly information gathering, processing and transfer – 
they are expected to regard themselves to become more proficient and to accomplish the 
assigned work in a superior manner over time (Sinha et al. 1997, Mikhail et al. 1997, Clement 
                                                          
5 The respective response options are provided in the table descriptions. 
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1999, Mikhail et al. 2003, Höfer and Oehler 2013). This leads us to hypothesize the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1: Self-perceived forecast accuracy is positively related with analysts’ experience. 
 
Analysts should possess and develop professional competences (e.g. know-how, expertise), 
social competences (e.g. teamwork, interaction and co-operation with colleagues and clients), 
and personal competences (e.g. own initiative, self-dependence, goal orientation). When 
analysts become more competent over time they are expected to assess their individual ability 
to make accurate forecasts more positively. This is because they are better in assessing and 
reflecting their actions and the environment in which they are operating in. This leads us to 
hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Self-perceived forecast accuracy is positively related with analysts’ 
competency. 
 
Analysts who are affiliated with investment banks or brokerage houses tend to issue 
optimistic and positively biased recommendations (Laderman et al. 1990, Sultz 1990, 
Siconolfi 1992). This in-house access to private information should be particularly beneficial 
for less skilled analysts because it helps them to compensate their lack of ability to gathering, 
processing and transferring information. Since regulatory guidelines inhibit information flows 
between, e.g., the investment division and analysts it is expected that inaccurate analysts 
assess the regulators’ undertakings less successful. On the other hand, accurate analysts are 
less dependent on information from insiders (e.g. colleagues who work for the bank’s 
brokerage or investment division). Consequently, it is likely that analysts with greater forecast 
ability evaluate the regulatory guidelines which attempt to reduce conflicts of interest, 
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strengthen Chinese Walls and implement independent analyst remuneration more positively. 
This is because the stricter regulatory regime establishes an environment where 1) individual 
analysts must play by the same rules and 2) analysts’ activities are monitored by regulatory 
authorities. This leads us to hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3: The lower the self-perceived forecast accuracy, the less successful are 
regulatory guidelines assessed by analysts. 
 
In order to gain deeper insight into the analysts’ response pattern, we report Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficients in Section 4. Spearman’s correlation provides a measure of a 
monotonic relationship between two items and can be used with ordinal data and is – contrary 
to Pearson’s correlation – robust to outliers. By following this approach, we can describe the 
relationship between the assessed items more thoroughly. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
From January to September 2013, we contacted 936 practicing analysts via e-mail or mail 
with the request to fill-in our questionnaire.6 Analysts who have not responded were contacted 
by telephone and received a reminder to send back the filled-in questionnaire. By September 
2013, 104 analysts sent back the completed questionnaire (response rate: 11 percent). Most 
analysts who were contacted work for larger European, US and Asian investment banks and 
brokerage houses. Analysts typically focus either on the buy-side or the sell-side. In our 
sample sell-side analysts represent 96 percent of all respondents and the remaining 4 percent 
                                                          
6 We contacted analysts who issued at least one investment recommendations within the last two years and 
whose contact details (full name, address, employer) were publicly available.  
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are buy-side analysts. Buy-side analysts rather focus on issuing recommendations for both 
institutional investors and large clients, while sell-side analysts emphasize on reports that are 
publicly available. Since buy-side analysts do not directly provide information that becomes 
part of the publicly available information pool, it is not surprising that sell-side analysts have 
a greater tendency to respond and to send back the completed questionnaire. 
Table 1 illustrates that most analysts in the sample work for investment banks (43 percent) 
and brokerage houses (39 percent). Only 8 and 6 percent are employed at savings banks and 
cooperative banks, respectively. Independent analyst houses account for 4 percent. This 
emphasizes that analysts work in organizations that utilize analyst recommendations not only 
to trade and invest on own account but also to provide investment banking and brokerage 
services for clients. 
 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
In our sample, analysts between 40 and 49 years of age and between 30 and 39 years of age 
account for 39 and 37 percent, respectively (Table 2). A minor fraction is above 50 years old 
(7 percent) and 17 percent are younger than 30 years. This is in line with the analyst-specific 
work experience they have acquired. 17 percent have up to 3 years of experience, whereas 26 
percent work for 6-10 and 11-15 years as analysts. On average, subjects acquire 10 years of 
analyst-specific work experience and 13 years of general work experience. Analysts’ 
experience is of relevance since Mikhail et al. (1997, 2003) and Höfer and Oehler (2013) find 
significant evidence that experienced analysts make more accurate forecasts. An accurate 
analyst is assumed to make earnings/target price forecasts with low forecast error. 
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In terms of educational background, a majority of 58 percent gained a university master’s 
degree or diploma7. 22 percent (16 percent) hold a bachelor’s (M.B.A.) degree. Merely 4 
percent gained a PhD. This shows that all analysts completed an university education program 
successfully. This is of particular interest since there are no formal prerequisites for the 
analyst profession. Although there is no formal minimum qualification, investment banks or 
brokerage houses seem to recruit only university graduates for analyst positions. Besides, one-
third of the analysts even attained additional qualifications in terms of CFA or CIIA 
certificates.  
Previous studies indicate that analysts operate in a competitive work environment (Hong and 
Kubik 2003) in which employers are changed constantly. Generally speaking, changing 
employers might be the outcome of a positively or negatively perceived professional self-
development. Hence, the reasons for changing one’s employer are that analysts are either 
headhunted or fired. In our sample, 33 percent have never experienced a change of employer 
and 24 percent (15 percent) went through a change of employment once (twice).8  
 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 documents the analysts’ areas of specialization and coverage. 90 percent state that 
they focus on certain sectors in their research. Most analysts emphasize on firms in the 
broader financial industry (financials, insurance, real estate) (21 percent), followed by the 
telecom, semiconductor and media sector (20 percent). 16 percent (14 percent) of the 
                                                          
7 In the German grading scheme a diploma is equivalent to a university master’s degree. 
8 Prior studies find heterogeneous evidence on the interrelation between analysts’ accuracy and employment 
situation (Mikhail et al. 1997, Mikhail et al. 2003, Höfer and Oehler 2013). Hence, it remains unclear whether 
analysts change employers because, as a result of their profound professional competences, they get 
promoted/headhunted or because they are inaccurate and, therefore, made redundant. 
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respondents are specialists in utility, metal and mining (automotive, manufacturing, 
machinery, transportation) stocks. On average, a single analyst covers 12 firms; that is, he or 
she makes investment recommendations for these firms on a regular basis. 43 percent report 
that they cover between 11 and 15 firms, followed by 31 percent of the analysts who cover 
between 6 and 10 firms.  
An issue that has been widely left unsought in the literature is whether analysts work in teams 
or on their own. This is of particular interest since the accuracy of earnings or price target 
forecasts might differ between recommendations made by a team of analysts and those made 
by an individual analyst. We find that nearly half (46 percent) of the analysts conduct 
recommendations on their own and the other 45 percent work in pairs. 7 percent state that 
three analysts are involved in the preparation of one research recommendation. 
 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.2 Results Discussion and Correlation Analysis 
Information gathering Process 
According to the literature, we understand that analysts utilize, e.g., firm presentations, 
interviews and earnings forecasts of the management in order to derive firm-specific 
investment recommendations (Chugh and Meador 1984). However, it is unclear to what 
extent analysts use different sources of information. Based on our survey, we find that 90 
percent of the respondents use news, ticker and ad-hoc news and market/industry data to do 
firm-specific research.9 Unsurprisingly, 98 percent (86 percent) gather information from 
                                                          
9 In this sub-section no table is provided. An overview of the results discussed in the text is available upon 
request. 
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companies’ quarterly reports (decision-makers of the firm to be evaluated). In line with the 
discussion in Section 3 on whether analysts work in teams or on their own, we examine that 
only 22 percent utilize information of bank-internal colleagues in order to collect relevant 
information. While only 22 percent pay attention to other analyst reports, 88 percent consider 
analyst conferences as relevant sources of information. In sum, based on their own responses 
analysts mostly seem to neglect the activities of peer analysts which is insofar unexpected as 
findings in the literature indicate that analysts herd, i.e. mimic the activities of other analysts, 
(Welch 2000, Hong et al. 2000, Jegadeesh and Kim 2010), and come to a consensus of 
opinion (Conroy and Harris 1987, Hayes and Levine 2000, Jegadeesh and Kim 2006). 
 
Performance Assessment and Forecast Accuracy 
Stickel (1992) finds that analysts are evaluated by their employers on four criteria: stock-
picking ability, earnings forecast accuracy, reports quality and overall service activities. 
However, based on our findings, Table 4 documents ambiguous results with respect to 
analysts’ performance assessment. 69 percent of the surveyed analysts do not undergo a 
performance assessment undertaken by their employer. This is remarkable since nowadays 
many professional activities are regularly evaluated (Banner and Cooke 1984). Though, 16 
analysts who argue that there is no performance assessment say that an appraisal is 
undertaken based on their forecast accuracy. In addition, 23 percent state that the number of 
forecasts is an element of the evaluation conducted by the employer. Consistent with findings 
in the literature, 47 percent of the analysts have, in fact, an incentive to make accurate 
forecasts since the employer judges analysts’ activities based on this criterion (Hong et al. 
2000, Hong and Kubik 2003). 
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[Please insert Table 4 here] 
 
Analysts tend to put larger emphasis on private information when making firm-specific 
earnings forecasts (Chen and Jiang 2006). This is one relevant aspect that potentially leads 
analysts to become overconfident (Fuller 1998, Friesen and Weller 2006) because they 
believe to possess superior information in contrast to their colleague analysts. Table 5 
indicates that a majority of 58 percent assumes to produce rather accurate (earnings/target 
price) forecasts. While 8 percent consider themselves as very accurate analysts, 4 percent 
believe that their forecast abilities are below average. Although, we cannot make clear-cut 
inferences on analysts’ potential overconfidence, we find that a larger proportion of analysts 
assumes to belong to those with above average forecast skills. 
 
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 6 provides a correlation analysis in order to examine the relationship between analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and analyst-specific characteristics including age, analyst-related work 
experience, general work experience, firm coverage, and employer changes. Since the 
response option in the questionnaire with respect to the item accuracy ranges from 1 (“very 
accurate”) to 5 (“less accurate) the negative correlation coefficients with respect to accuracy 
and age-related items indicate that, e.g., age and accuracy are positively related. For instance, 
this documents that older analysts tend to assess themselves as accurate forecasters. Thus, we 
find considerable evidence that supports our Hypothesis 1. Since the items age, analyst-
related experience, general experience are inherently highly correlated we obtain similar 
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findings between the last-mentioned items and accuracy. In addition, analysts’ self-perceived 
accuracy corresponds positively with the number of employer changes. Given these empirical 
findings, analysts who have experienced employer changes tend to evaluated themselves as 
more accurate. In Section 3 we discussed that up to four analysts are involved in the 
preparation of one investment recommendation. The findings in Table 6 document that 
number of analysts generating an investment recommendation corresponds negatively with 
accuracy. This shows that more analysts being involved in the preparation process leads 
analysts to assess themselves as rather inaccurate. 
 
 [Please insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 7 shows that the advancement of professional, social and personal competences 
correlates positively with the self-perceived forecast accuracy. In particular, it is not 
surprising that both professional and personal competences are more related with accuracy 
than social competences. This is because analysts’ self-initiative as well as knowledge and 
expertise in terms of financial markets, IT-based evaluation models, corporate finance, 
regulatory framework and professional competences are not only relevant elements of 
professional competences but also determinants of forecast ability. Given these findings, there 
is evidence that supports our Hypothesis 2. In addition, the results in Table 7 document that 
professional and social competences tend to be not related whereas personal and social as well 
as personal and professional competences are highly positively correlated. 
 
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
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Factors influencing Analysts’ Investment Recommendations 
Computer-based IT models have become significantly relevant across industries over the last 
decade. Therefore, we asked analysts to assess the influence of computer-based IT evaluation 
models during the development of investment recommendations (Table 8). In our sample, 
one-third categorizes the role of IT models as rather influential and another 13 percent believe 
the computer programs to be very influential. This leads to the question whether it is solely 
the analyst who derives investment recommendations or the computer program which 
determines the outcome of the research report. In contrast, one-third of the surveyed analysts 
states that computer-based IT models play no significant role in order to determine 
recommendations for investors. 
 
[Please insert Table 8 here] 
 
Table 9 provides an overview of factors influencing analysts’ firm-specific research reports. 
By and large, analysts consider key financial data/ratios (including earnings, cash flows, P/E 
ratio, book-to-market ratio), the long-term outlook of a firm and the quality of a firm’s 
management staff to be rather influential or very influential factors. Less relevant aspects 
include technical analysis indicators and analysts’ consensus recommendations. Specifically, 
the low influence of technical analysis indicators seems to be surprising since practice-
orientated studies in the literature regard technical and fundamental analysis as 
complementary designs of analysis; it is well documented that technical advice may be self-
fulfilling (Taylor and Allen 1992, Blume et al. 1994). When analysts make forecasts, 
especially target price forecasts, they should take into account not only the overall economic 
outlook but also regulatory issues. On the one hand, besides firm-specific and industry-
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specific information analysts should incorporate the expected overall economic changes 
because the latter aspect also potentially determines future stock prices. On the other hand, the 
regulatory environment has been constantly changing during the last decade. This is why 
analysts should ensure to take, e.g., the recent disclosure requirements into account. In this 
context, 41 percent (14 percent) assume the overall economic outlook to be a rather influential 
factor (very influential factor), while 32 percent (12 percent) regard regulatory measures to be 
rather influential (very influential). About one-third of the surveyed analysts finds these two 
factors to be neither influential nor less influential. 
 
[Please insert Table 9 here] 
 
The Effect of Employer Activities and Regulatory Guidelines 
Table 10 presents the respondents assessment of their employers’ activities which potentially 
affect firm-specific research reports. In particular during the late 1990s and early 2000, 
numerous conflicts of interest became crucial. The three core aspects causing these conflicts 
of interest are the objectives of analysts’ employers to promote investment activities, 
underwriting services and brokerage commissions. By and large, most analysts assess their 
employers underwriting and investment activities to be less influential. However, about half 
of the analysts state that they assist their employer to generate brokerage commission by 
means of regular research reports. Hence, it is not surprising that the majority of most 
research reports include “buy” recommendations (Michaely and Womack 1999, Agrawal and 
Chen 2005, Boni and Womack 2006). Specifically, 20 percent and 32 percent of the analysts 
regard the task to produce research reports on a regularly basis in order to generate brokerage 
commission as very influential and rather influential, respectively. A lower proportion of 7 
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percent (21 percent) find the aforementioned objective of the employer to be less influential 
(very influential).  
 
[Please insert Table 10 here] 
 
The presented findings emphasize the existence of conflicts of interest that regulatory 
authorities primarily attempted to tackle.10 The findings in Table 11 indicate that regulatory 
guidelines have no impact upon 62 percent of the surveyed analysts. Furthermore, 44 percent 
(23 percent) assess the recent regulatory effort to reduce conflicts of interest to be less 
successful (rather less successful). A crucial element to mitigate potential conflicts of interest 
is to install an independent remuneration for analysts. For instance, the MiFID directive 
developed by the European Union specifies such a measure must be implemented in banks 
which communicate analyst recommendations. In this respect, two-third assesses the 
implementation of an independent remuneration for analysts as less successful. Another 
important aspect on the regulator’s agenda is to strengthen Chinese Walls (Kolasinski 2006). 
24 percent (28 percent) evaluate the regulatory measures to enhance Chinese Walls as very 
successful (rather successful). However, 22 percent still find need for improvement and state 
that the regulator was less successful in strengthening Chinese Walls. Thus far, our findings 
indicate that analysts are rather divided on interpreting the success of regulatory guidelines. 
 
[Please insert Table 11 here] 
 
The aforementioned results document that large proportion of the surveyed analysts evaluates 
                                                          
10 See the discussion on Rule NASD 2711, Rule NYSE 472, and the “Global Analyst Research Settlement”, 
MAD, and MiFID in Section 3. 
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the recent regulatory guidelines in order to reduce conflicts of interest as less successful. As 
Table 12 shows, the self-perceived forecast accuracy correlates positively with the assessment 
of the success of regulatory guidelines. This suggests that analysts who, for instance, assess 
themselves as less accurate also evaluate the imposed regulations as less successful. Hence, 
we find evidence that supports our Hypothesis 3. In addition, since the reduction of conflicts 
of interest is strongly related with the introduction of Chinese Walls the high correlation 
coefficient of 0.7677 is not surprising. 
 
[Please insert Table 12 here] 
 
5 Conclusion 
Analysts’ activities appear to be a black box for investors. This is why we surveyed both sell-
side and buy-side security analysts. Uncertainty about the quality of analysts’ investment 
recommendations is a major concern for retail investors. This quality uncertainty is 
determined by three core aspects including analyst-specific characteristics, the intransparent 
research process and conflicts of interest emerging in the context of analysts’ activities.  
Based on our unique data set we attain an understanding of sources of information used by 
analysts to undertake firm-specific research, of analysts’ self-perceived forecast accuracy, of 
the influence of IT-based evaluation models as part of the forecast process and an 
understanding of the performance evaluation undertaken by analysts’ employers. We find that 
analysts (strongly) rely on IT-based evaluation models when deriving investment 
recommendations. The average analyst in our sample graduated from university, has 10 years 
of professional experience and covers 12 firms on a regular basis. In addition, our results 
show that more than 50 percent of the analysts specify that their employers’ objective to 
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generate brokerage commission (by regularly producing research reports) is very/rather 
influential with respect to the determination of investment recommendations. This is why we 
thoroughly examine the recent regulatory efforts to mitigate conflicts of interest. By and large, 
we find that analysts assess the regulatory guidelines rather less successful. 
This paper has some limitations which should not be unmentioned. In order to gain a deeper 
insight into analysts’ activities it might be of interest to compare the self-perceived forecast 
accuracy with the actual earnings or target price forecast accuracy. Such a procedure would 
require that the analysts who participated in the survey are also included in the usual data 
bases (i.e. I/B/E/S or Zacks Investment Research). Hence, it would be possible to examine 
empirically, e.g., overconfident or herd behavior among analysts in a different fashion. 
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Table 1: Analyst employer 
 Number Percentage 
Investment bank 44 43 
Brokerage house 40 39 
Savings bank 8 8 
Cooperative bank 6 6 
Independent analyst house 4 4 
Total 102 100 
Note: This table provides a distribution of the categories of analysts 
employers in the sample. The categories include investment banks, 
brokerage houses, savings banks, cooperative banks and independent 
analyst houses. The number of responses and the respective 
percentages are provided. 
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Table 2: Analyst-specific characteristics 
 Number Percentage 
A. Age (in years)   
<30 17 17 
30-39 37 37 
40-49 40 39 
>50 7 7 
Total 101 100 
Median 38 years  
   
B. Highest degree   
Bachelor 22 22 
Master/Diploma 57 58 
M.B.A. 16 16 
Doctoral Degree 4 4 
Total 99 100 
   
C. Certification   
Charterholder  32 31 
Noncharterholder 72 69 
Total 104 100 
   
D. Experience as analyst (years)   
0-3 17 17 
4-5 10 10 
6-10 27 26 
11-15 27 26 
16-20 15 15 
More than 21 6 6 
Total 102 100 
Median 10 years  
   
E. General work experience 
(years) 
  
0-3 7 7 
4-5 8 8 
6-10 23 22 
11-15 26 25 
16-20 23 23 
21-25 12 12 
More than 26 3 3 
Total 102 100 
Median 13 years  
 
--- cont’d --- 
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Table 2: Analyst-specific characteristics  
 Number Percentage 
F. Number of employer changes   
0 32 33 
1  24 25 
2 14 15 
3 13 13 
4 7 7 
5 3 3 
6 2 2 
More than 6 2 2 
Total 97 100 
Median 1  
Note: This table provides an overview of analysts’ responses with 
respect to questions on age, university education, certification and 
experience (analyst-specific experience and work experience in 
general) (Panel A-F). For each response option the number of 
analysts responded and the respective percentages are specified. If 
meaningful, median values are provided. 
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Table 3: Specialization and Coverage 
 Number Percentage 
A. Sector-specific specialization   
yes 94 90 
no 10 10 
Total 104 100 
   
B. Sector distribution   
Financials, Insurance, Real Estate 20 21 
Automotive, Manufacturing, 
Machinery, Transport 
14 14 
Telecom, Semiconductor, Media 19 20 
Utility, Metals, Mining 15 16 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Health 
Care, Biotechnology 
10 11 
Chemicals 7 7 
Consumer Goods, Retail 10 11 
Total 95 100 
   
C. Number of firms covered   
0-3 3 3 
4-5 5 5 
6-10 32 31 
11-15 45 43 
16-20 11 11 
21-25 2 2 
More than 26 5 5 
Total 103 100 
Median 12  
   
   
D. Number of analysts involved in 
the preparation of one report 
  
1 47 46 
2 46 45 
3 7 7 
4 2 2 
Total 102 100 
Median 2  
Note: This table provides an overview of analysts’ responses with 
respect to areas of specialization and coverage. Panel A, B, C and D 
provides the results for sector-specific specialization, sector 
distribution, number of firms covered, number of employer changes 
and number of analysts involved in the preparation of one research 
report, respectively. The number of responses and the respective 
percentages are provided. 
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Table 4: Performance Assessment 
 Number Percentage 
A. There is no performance 
assessment 
  
yes 70 69 
no 32 31 
Total 102 100 
   
B. Number of forecasts   
yes 23 23 
no 79 77 
Total 102 100 
   
C. Forecast Accuracy   
yes 48 47 
no 54 53 
Total 102 100 
Note: This table provides an overview of analysts’ responses with 
respect to their performance assessment. Panel A, B and C provides 
the results for the answer categories “There is no performance 
assessment”, “Number of forecasts” and “Forecast Accuracy”, 
respectively. The number of responses and the respective 
percentages are provided. 
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Table 5: Self-perceived forecast accuracy 
 Number Percentage 
very accurate 8 8 
rather accurate 61 58 
average 31 30 
rather less accurate 3 3 
less accurate 1 1 
Total 104 100 
Note: This table provides an overview of analysts’ responses with 
respect to questions on their self-perceived forecast accuracy. The 
response option for this question ranges from very accurate, rather 
accurate, neutral, rather less accurate to less accurate. The number of 
responses and the respective percentages are provided. 
 
  
33 
 
Table 6: Correlation analysis of analysts’ accuracy and analyst-specific characteristics 
 Accuracy Age 
Analyst-
specific 
Work 
Experience 
General 
Work 
Exp-
erience  
Firm 
Coverage 
Employer 
Changes 
Age 
-0.156* 
101 
     
Analyst-specific 
Work Experience 
-0.242** 
102 
0.875*** 
101 
    
General Work 
Experience  
-0.173** 
102 
0.929*** 
101 
0.867*** 
102 
   
Firm Coverage 
-0.004* 
103 
-0.132* 
101 
-0.012* 
102 
-0.080* 
102 
  
Employer 
Changes 
-0.163* 
99 
0.488*** 
98 
0.609*** 
98 
0.472*** 
98 
-0.073* 
99 
 
Involvement of 
other Analysts 
0.123* 
103 
-0.029* 
101 
-0.032* 
102 
-0.620* 
102 
0.194** 
103 
-0.136* 
99 
Note: This table provides an overview of the correlation analysis of analysts’ self-perceived 
forecast accuracy and their individual characteristics. The latter are separated into age (in 
years), work experience as analysts, general work experience, the number of firms they cover, 
the number of employer changes, and the number of analysts involved in the preparation of one 
research report. With respect to the item accuracy the response options range from 1 to 5 
(1=very accurate, 2=rather accurate, 3=neutral, 4=rather less accurate, 5=less accurate). The 
correlation coefficients, the respective significance levels, and the numbers of observations are 
provided. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent 
level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Correlation analysis of analysts’ accuracy 
and competence assessment 
 Accuracy 
Professional 
Competences  
Social 
Competences 
Professional 
Competences  
0.241** 
103 
  
Social 
Competences 
0.166* 
103 
0.111 
103 
 
Personal 
Competences 
0.221** 
103 
0.426*** 
103 
0.455*** 
103 
Note: This table provides an overview of the 
correlation analysis of analysts’ self-perceived forecast 
accuracy and the assessment of own competences 
including professional competences (know-how, 
expertise), social competences (teamwork, motivation 
etc.), and personal competences (own initiative, self-
dependence, goal orientation etc.). With respect to the 
item accuracy the response options range from 1 to 5 
(1=very accurate, 2=rather accurate, 3=neutral, 
4=rather less accurate, 5=less accurate). With respect 
to the questions on competences the response options 
also range from 1 to 5 (1=excellent, 2=rather excellent, 
3=neutral, 4=rather less good, 5=less good). The 
correlation coefficients, the respective significance 
levels, and the numbers of observations are provided. 
The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
one, five, and ten percent level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Influence of computer-based IT evaluation models 
 Number Percentage 
very influential 14 13 
rather influential 33 32 
neutral 25 24 
rather less influential 21 20 
less influential 11 11 
Total 104 100 
Note: This table provides an overview of analysts’ responses with 
respect to questions on the influence of computer-based IT 
evaluation models. The response option for this question ranges from 
very influential, rather influential, neutral, rather less influential to 
less influential. The number of responses and the respective 
percentages are provided. 
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Table 9: Assessment of the influence of factors affecting analysts’ firm-specific research reports 
 
Key financial 
data 
Long-term 
outlook of firm 
Quality of 
firm’s 
management 
Technical 
analysis 
indicators 
Overall 
economic 
outlook 
Regulatory 
specifications 
Financial ratios 
Analysts’ 
consensus 
recommendations 
 N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P 
very influential 73 70 59 57 34 33 0 0 14 14 13 12 40 39 1 1 
rather influential 30 29 30 29 50 49 2 2 43 41 33 32 42 40 18 7 
neutral 1 1 13 12 18 17 20 19 32 31 45 44 15 14 34 33 
rather less influential 0 0 2 2 1 1 38 37 15 14 9 9 6 6 29 28 
less influential 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 42 0 0 3 3 1 1 22 21 
Total 104 100 104 100 103 100 104 100 104 100 103 100 104 100 104 100 
Note: This table provides an overview of the results of factors influencing analysts’ firm specific research reports. The factors are key financial data (earnings, cash flows, 
dividends, book value), long-term outlook of the firm, quality of firm’s management staff, technical analysis indicators, overall economic outlook, regulatory specifications, 
financial ratios (P/E ratio, book-to-market ratio), analysts’ consensus recommendations. Given these factors, analysts were asked to assess the degree of influence regarding the 
outcome of firm-specific research reports. The response option for this question ranges from very influential, rather influential, neutral, rather less influential to less influential. N 
is the number of responses and P indicates the respective percentages. 
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Table 10: Assessment of employers’ activities affecting analysts’ firm-specific research reports 
 
Underwriting activities (i.e. 
analysts’ employer 
conducts IPO or other 
services for evaluated firm) 
Generating brokerage 
commission 
Investment activities (i.e. 
analysts’ employer holds 
shares in the evaluated firm) 
 N P N P N P 
very influential 3 3 20 20 1 1 
rather influential 12 12 32 31 6 6 
neutral 20 20 22 21 12 12 
rather less influential 19 19 7 7 16 15 
less influential 46 46 21 21 67 66 
Total 100 100 102 100 102 100 
Note: This table provides an overview of the results of factors influencing analysts’ firm specific research reports due to 
employers’ activities. The factors are underwriting activities (i.e. analysts’ employer conducts IPO or other services for 
evaluated firm), generating brokerage commission by regularly producing research reports and investment activities (i.e. 
analysts’ employer holds shares in the evaluated firm). Given these factors, analysts were asked to assess the degree of 
influence regarding the outcome of firm-specific research reports. The response option for this question ranges from very 
influential, rather influential, neutral, rather less influential to less influential. N is the number of responses and P indicates the 
respective percentages. 
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Table 11: Assessment of regulatory guidelines 
A. Do regulatory guidelines (i.e. MAD or MiFID) have an impact upon your activities as an 
analyst? 
 
 Number Percentage  
yes 35 38  
no 57 62  
Total 92 100  
    
B. Assessment of the success of regulatory guidelines  
 
Reducing conflicts of 
interest in the context of the 
production of analysts’ 
research reports 
Strengthening Chinese 
Walls (between analyst and, 
e.g., the investment banking 
division) 
Implementing independent 
remuneration for analysts 
 N P N P N P 
very successful 1 1 19 24 0 0 
rather successful 11 14 22 28 6 8 
neutral 14 18 14 18 11 14 
rather less successful 18 23 6 8 9 12 
less successful 34 44 17 22 51 66 
Total 78 100 78 100 77 100 
Note: This table provides an overview of the results of the assessment of regulatory guidelines. In particular, analysts were 
asked to state whether the regulatory guidelines (i.e. MAD or MiFID) have an impact upon their activities as analysts (Panel 
A). In addition, in Panel B analysts were asked to assess the success of regulatory guidelines with respect to the reduction of 
conflicts of interest, strengthening Chinese Walls and implementing an independent remuneration for analysts. The response 
option for this question ranges from very successful, rather successful, neutral, rather less successful to less successful. N is the 
number of responses and P indicates the respective percentages. 
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Table 12: Correlation analysis of analysts’ 
accuracy and the success of regulation 
 Accuracy 
Reducing 
Conflicts 
of Interest 
Strength-
ening 
Chinese 
Walls 
Reducing 
Conflicts of 
Interest 
0.229** 
79 
  
Strengthening 
Chinese Walls 
0.240** 
79 
0.767*** 
79 
 
Implementing 
Independent 
Remuneration for 
Analysts 
0.242** 
77 
0.581*** 
77 
0.584*** 
77 
Note: This table provides an overview of the 
correlation analysis of analysts’ self-perceived forecast 
accuracy and the success of regulatory guidelines with 
regard to reducing conflicts of interest, strengthening 
Chinese Walls, and implementing an independent 
remuneration for analysts. With respect to the item 
accuracy the response options range from 1 to 5 
(1=very accurate, 2=rather accurate, 3=neutral, 
4=rather less accurate, 5=less accurate). The response 
option for question on the success of regulatory 
guidelines ranges from 1 to 5 (1=very successful, 
2=rather successful, 3=neutral, 4=rather less 
successful, 5=less successful). The correlation 
coefficients, the respective significance levels, and the 
numbers of observations are provided. The symbols 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five, and 
ten percent level, respectively. 
 
  
 
 
